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Polen / Poland
| DD.MM.YYYY | German | English | Notes |
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| »Eine Verständigung mit Polen ist weder möglich noch erwünscht. Die Spannung zu Polen muß schon aus dem Grunde erhalten bleiben, damit das Interesse der Welt an einer Revision der deutsch-polnischen Grenze nicht einschläft. Daß Polen mit dem Gedanken eines Präventivkriegs wegen unserer territorialen Forderungen spielt, ist bekannt. Unsere Politik muß daher mit großer Vorsicht operieren und Einzelaktionen vermeiden.«
~ Bernhard von Bülow, zit. nach ADAP, C, 1, 1, Dokument 142, S. 259. |
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| »Glauben Sie, irgend jemand von uns hätte nach dem Sommer 1940 etwas an der Tatsache ändern können, daß Polen den Krieg wegen des im Frühjahr 1939 gegebenen Versprechens der englischen Regierung riskiert hatte, nicht nur Ostpreußen sondern auch Oberschlesien zu erhalten?«
~ Heinrich Brüning, zitiert in: Scheil, Stefan: Polen 1939: Kriegskalkül, Vorbereitung, Vollzug, Schnellroda: Antaois-Verlag 2013), S. 63. |
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| 18.03.1930 | »All daß veranlaßt mich zu der ergebensten Bitte, Sie, hochverehrter Herr Reichsminister, möchten gütigst der Erwägung einer anderweitigen Verwendung für mich nähertreten. Vulgär gesagt: Ich kann nach all den Kämpfen, Intrigen und Ermüdungen keinen Polen mehr sehen!«
~ Ulrich Rauscher, 18.03.1930, ADAP, B/14, S. 378. |
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| 1930 | »One might have thought that a century of suffering would have changed many things. When, after the war, we saw the Poles reappear at Versailles and in all our capitals, we found that they were still the delightful and unpractical Poles of old. Their public men flooded the Cabinets of the Entente with memorials, reports, plans, historical reconstructions, juridical theses without end. According to them, half of Europe had been Polish and might have become Polish again. Poles are sometimes accused of a somewhat feminine want of logic. These Poles were terribly logical and persistent, with the result that everybody got sick of their claims. So it happened, for instance, that when Dmowski asked for the annexation of East Prussia to Poland, to avoid, as he very logically said, the paradox of the Dantzig Corridor, diplomatic Europe became so irritated with these eternally increasing demands that, had matters depended on Lloyd George alone, we might have seen in the end a Fourth Partition.«
~ Carlo Sforza, former Italian foreign minister, in: Makers of Modern Europe, London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot 1930, p. 367. |
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| 27.10.1932 | »Wenn es den Leitern der Außenpolitik der Republik gelungen ist, die Sicherheit der Ostgrenze des Staates durch Abschluß des Nichtangriffspakts mit Sowjetrußland zu garantieren, so kann dieses Tatsache nur eine Bedeutung haben: Sie macht uns die Hände gegenüber Deutschland frei.«
~ Josef Beck, damaliger Oberst, 27.10.1932, zit. nach einem Bericht der Bundespolizeidirektion in Wien an den österreichischen Bundeskanzler Dollfuß über einen Brief von Beck and Pilsudski, 04.11.1932 zit. nach: Scheil, Stefan: Polens Zwischenkrieg. Der Weg der Zweiten Republik von Versailles nach Gleiwitz, Pour le Merite 2022, S. 143 ff. |
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| 27.10.1932 | »Wenn das nicht erkannt wird, werden nicht nur wir selbst, sondern auch unsere Kinder Groß-Polen nicht erleben.«
~ Josef Beck, damaliger Oberst, 27.10.1932, zit. nach einem Bericht der Bundespolizeidirektion in Wien an den österreichischen Bundeskanzler Dollfuß über einen Brief von Beck and Pilsudski, 04.11.1932 zit. nach: Scheil, Stefan: Polens Zwischenkrieg. Der Weg der Zweiten Republik von Versailles nach Gleiwitz, Pour le Merite 2022, S. 146. |
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| »Wie haben schon vor einigen Jahren vorausschauend den Alliierten ein Losschlagen gegen den Feind vorgeschlagen, als er seine Kräfte erst zu entfalten begann. Die Alliierten glaubten, daß sich dieses Problem ohne Krieg lösen lasse und die Deutschen in ihren Eroberungszügen aufgehalten werden könnten. Wir glaubten nicht daran und heute sehen wir, daß das Recht auf der Seite der polnischen Staatsraison war.«
~ Josef Beck zit. nach Hans Roos: Die "Präventivkriegspläne" Pilsudskis von 1933, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jhg. 3 (1955), Nr. 4, S. 344-363, hier S. 347. |
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| »...the Pilsudski government instructed its ambassador in Washington Filipowicz, to bring to Hoover's attention the fact that "there is at almost any moment the danger of the invasion of Polish territory by German irregular troops" and that the Poles were determined to counter by marching into Germany "to settle the thing once and for all" regardless "of any action of the League of Nations or anyone else." The Polish representations caused Secretary of State Stimson to state at a press conference that "the question of Polish-German relations was a purely European problem in which the American Government had no direct interest." This was followed by a terse communique issued by the White House on October 25, 1931: "A press statement that the President has proposed any revision of the Polish Corridor is absolutely without foundation. The President has made no suggestion of any such character."«
~ Sharp, Samuel L.: Poland. White Eagle on a Red Field, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 280-281. |
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| 1936 | »When Hitler marched the German Army into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, Minister Beck asked the French Ambassador in Poland, even before the French government had reached its decision, to relay to Paris the message that Poland understood the difficult position of France and was ready to carry out its alliance obligations. [...]
In spite of his first fighting speech of Premier Sarraut [on March 8], Minister Beck expected that the chances of armed reaction on the part of France were exceedingly small. Nevertheless, his move was of great political significance. At the conclusion of the nonaggression declaration with Germany, special stress was placed on the fact that the declaration did not in the least alter our earlier commitments. this referred mainly to the alliance with France and the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Our envoy to Berlin at that time took particular care that the German side should be aware that we remained definitely true to our commitments towards France. We assured France as well, that the declaration of nonaggression with Germany did not restrict our freedom of action within the framework of the alliance.«
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| 1946 | »The last hundred years have been the Century of nationalism, and the States created or revived by the 1919 Peace Treaties were regarded as National States. Among these States was Poland. Yet the Polish ruling class and Polish intellectuals had aimed at the restoration of a Poland bounded by the frontiers of 1772. These frontiers would not in any way correspond with ethnical boundaries, and a State contained within them would not be a National State. Historical Poland was not a National State, but a multinational Empire which arose in the course of centuries when the dogma of Nationalism, as understood in modem times, did not exist. Poland was destroyed at the end of the eighteenth century, but a movement for its restoration continued to exist in all three portions of the dismembered State. This movement consisted only of people of Polish language and nationality. Among these Poles a nationalism in the modern sense developed, from the time of the French Revolution onwards. Its aim appeared to the outside world to be to liberate the Poles, that is the people of Polish language and nationality, from the yoke of Prussia, Russia and Austria. The Polish national movement enjoyed much sympathy abroad, particularly in France, Britain, Italy and the United States of America. In fact, however, the aim of this movement, as conceived by its political and intellectual leaders, was not merely the liberation of Poles from foreign rule, but the restoration of Historical Poland, a State including millions of people who were not Poles, and who during the course of the nineteenth century had developed for themselves a much stronger national consciousness than they had possessed in the days when Historical Poland existed. The fact that, the true political aim of the Polish ruling class was not nationalist at all but imperialist, that it involved the domination of Poles over large numbers of people of origin other than Polish, has never been sufficiently understood in Western Europe, and this failure to understand it has been responsible for errors in the policy of the Western Powers towards Poland.«
~ Hugh Seton-Watson, British historian, diplomat and secret agent, in: Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941, London: Cambridge University Press 1946, p. 320. |
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| »We frowned when Pilsudski twice a year suggested to France armed action against Germany while there was time. Why should not a century and a half of old scores be paid off and new ones economically prevented? But the French were costive , and their men dead. So Pilsudski, an exponent of 'one thing or another' - a phrase always anathema to us - cogitated other insurance.«
~ Vansittart, Robert: The Mist of Procession. The autobiography of Lord Vansittart, Longon: Hutchinsons & Co. 1958, p. 412. |
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| 1984 | »Ende Juli 1925 setzten Massenabschiebungen aus Polen ein. Binnen einer Woche mussten 20 000 Deutsche Polen verlassen. Die Auffanglager in Scheidemühl waren bald überfüllt...«
~ Doß, Kurt: Zwischen Weimar und Warschau. Ulrich Rauscher. Deutscher Gesandter in Polen 1922-1930. Eine politische Biographie, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag 1984, S. 106. |
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| 2010 | »Das Großmachtstreben war der Fluch unserer politischen Linie. Es verfestigte sich die Überzeugung, dass Polen, um existieren zu können, eine Großmacht sein müsse, das heißt, stark genug, um sich selbst eine von seinen Nachbarn unabhängige staatliche Existenz zu sichern. [Beck] nennt Sienkiewicz einen genialen Apostel des nationalen Größenwahns Polens, räumt aber ein, dass [der Schriftsteller] ‚als Künstler’ intuitiv den Misston in diesem Größenwahn wahrgenommen und ihn mit der Einführung der Figur des Zagloba korrigiert habe; allerdings habe ich nicht den Eindruck, dass er in Polen viel Verständnis für diesen literarischen Kunstgriff gefunden hat.
[...] [Neutralität] schien den Anforderungen einer weniger aggressiven Politik gegenüber den Nachbarn angemessen, während die polnische Großmachtpolitik nicht auf Konzepte für eine Abtrennung der Ukraine und des Kaukasus von Russland verzichtete und weiterhin das Ziel formulierte, sich Danzig, wenn nicht sogar Ostpreußen einzuverleiben usw. Gewisse Aktivitäten in dieser Richtung, die sich am besten als Eiertanz beschreiben lassen, wurden durchaus von staatlichen Stellen oder von staatlich finanzierten Institutionen unternommen. Die Öffentlichkeit war darauf unglaublich stolz und sehr zufrieden damit.«
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»The great power aspiration was the bane of our political line. It solidified the conviction that Poland, in order to exist, had to be a great power, that is, strong enough to secure for itself a state existence independent of its neighbors. [Beck] calls Sienkiewicz a brilliant apostle of Poland's national megalomania, but concedes that [the writer] 'as an artist' intuitively perceived the discord in this megalomania and corrected it by introducing the figure of Zagloba; however, I do not have the impression that he found much understanding in Poland for this literary artifice.
[...] [Neutrality] seemed appropriate to the requirements of a less aggressive policy toward the neighbors, while Polish great power policy did not renounce concepts of separating Ukraine and the Caucasus from Russia and continued to formulate the goal of annexing Danzig, if not East Prussia, and so on. Certain activities in this direction, which can best be described as dancing on eggshells, were certainly undertaken by state agencies or by state-funded institutions. The public was incredibly proud of this and very pleased with it.«
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| »Colonel Beck was apprehensive of negotiations, not because they seemed hopeless, but for fear lest Hitler really consented to a compromise, and also lest Britain perhaps show an inclination to impose the compromise on Poland.«
~ Michael Freund, in: Freund, Michael: Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten. Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Dokumenten, Bd. III, Der Ausbruch des Krieges 1939, München: Verlag Herder Freiburg und Verlag Karl Alber Freibug 1956, S. 308 ff. |
Wehrmacht
| DD.MM.YYYY | German | English | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| »Die deutschen Bodentruppen fügten den gegnerischen britischen und amerikanischen Truppen unter sämtlichen Umständen etwa 50 Prozent mehr Verluste zu, als sie selbst erlitten. Dies galt sowohl beim Angriff als auch bei der Verteidigung, bei lokaler zahlenmäßiger Überlegenheit und bei - was in der Regel der Fall war - zahlenmäßiger Unterlegenheit, mit Luftüberlegenheit und ohne Luftüberlegenheit, bei Siegen und bei Niederlagen.«
~ Dupuy, Trevor N.: A Genius for War. The German Army and General Staff. 1807-1945, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1977, S. 253 f. |
»On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.«
~ Dupuy, Trevor N.: A Genius for War. The German Army and General Staff. 1807-1945, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1977, pp. 253-254. |
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| »Die unumstößliche Wahrheit ist, dass Hitlers Wehrmacht die herausragende Kampftruppe des Zweiten Weltkriegs war, eine der größten der Geschichte.«
~ Max Hastings, in: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/05/05/their-wehrmacht-was-better-than-our-army/0b2cfe73-68f4-4bc3-a62d-7626f6382dbd/?noredirect=on |
»The inescapable truth is that Hitler's Wehrmacht was the outstanding fighting force of World War II, one of the greatest in history.«
~ Max Hastings, in: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/05/05/their-wehrmacht-was-better-than-our-army/0b2cfe73-68f4-4bc3-a62d-7626f6382dbd/?noredirect=on |
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| »Es besteht überhaupt kein Zweifel, wem der ersten Preis gebührt: Den Deutschen! [...]
Die Deutschen waren im Zweiten Weltkrieg sehr, sehr gut, von Norwegen bis Sizilien, von Frankreich bis Stalingrad, von der Normandie bis Nordafrika. Wo immer sie kämpften, waren sie im Großen und Ganzen gut geführt und gut diszipliniert und größtenteils, mit wenigen Ausnahmen in der regulären Armee, guten Charakters.«
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»Before we move too far from the Second World War reflection upon it inevitably invites judgement on the quality of professional performance in the chief contenders. There is no doubt at all about who wins first prize. It is the Germans. An army's good qualities are best shown when it is losing. [...]
The Germans in the Second World War were very, very good, from Norway to Sicily, from France to Stalingrad, from Normandy to North Africa. Wherever they fought they were on the whole well commanded and well disciplined and for the most part, with exceptions little found in the regular army, well behaved.«
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| »Die Deutschen sind natürliche Kämpfer, das müssen wir zugeben sie [waren] geborene Krieger.
Und sie waren hervorragend ausgebildet, sehr gekonnt ausgebildet, besonders ihre Unteroffiziere. Und das Fundament ihrer Disziplin war unnachgiebig.«
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»The Germans are natural fighters, we must accept that, they [were] natural warriors.
And they were very highly trained, very ably trained, particularly in their noncommissioned officers. And the basis of their discipline was unbending.«
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| »The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. [...] The quality of the Germans’ weapons – above all tanks – was of immense importance. Their tactics were masterly: stubborn defence; concentrated local firepower from mortars and machine-guns; quick counter-attacks to recover lost ground. Units often fought on even when cut off, which was not a mark of fanaticism, but of sound tactical discipline... [...] Their junior leadership was much superior to that of the Americans, perhaps also to that of the British.«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Overlord. D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, New York: 1984, p. 315-316. |
Publisher should be added | ||
| »Throughout the Second World War, where British or American troops met the Germans in anything like equal strength, the Germans almost always prevailed. They possessed an historic reputation as formidable soldiers. Under Hitler their army attained its zenith. Weapon for weapon and tank for tank, even in 1944, its equipment decisively outclassed that of the Allies in every category save artillery and transport.«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Overlord. D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, New York: 1984, p. 24. |
Publisher should be added | ||
| »It remains an extraordinary feature of the war in the west that, despite the vast weight of technology at the disposal of the Allies, British and American soldiers were called upon to fight the German army in 1944–45 with weapons inferior in every category save that of artillery.«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Overlord. D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, New York: 1984. |
I don't know the page number. It is in the beginning of the foreword though. | ||
| »Yet amid all this, in northwest Europe the Allied leaders invited their ground troops to fight the Wehrmacht with equipment inferior in every category save artillery and transport. German machine-guns, mortars, machine-pistols, antitank weapons and armored personnel carriers were all superior to those of Britain and America.«
~ Max Hastings, in: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/05/05/their-wehrmacht-was-better-than-our-army/0b2cfe73-68f4-4bc3-a62d-7626f6382dbd/?noredirect=on |
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| »Man for man, the Wehrmacht was probably the most formidable fighting force in the world until at least 1943, if not later. German soldiers were even known for showing more initiative than the soldiers of democratic France, Britain, and the United States.«
~ Max Boot, in: Boot, Max: War Made New, New York: 2006, p. 462. |
See also pp. 238, 553. | ||
| »On the broadest level, three things characterized this doctrine. The first was a military ethos that could not have been more different from the cliché of zombie-like obedience popularly ascribed to the German military. The army’s concept of Auftragstaktik stressed qualities such as flexibility, daring and independent thinking. Its most successful proponents knew which qualities to display in which situations, but the effect of Auftragstaktik overall was clear at every level of the army’s successful campaigns.
[...] Then there was the stress the German army placed on superior organization. At all levels, the German army was more effectively organized than all the opposing armies it faced during the war’s first two years. It had superior communications, enabling its field officers to coordinate individual combat engagements more effectively; efficient coordination with the Luftwaffe through its network of liaison officers; and a superior operational command structure that was – for the most part – unafraid to give thrusting subordinate commanders their head as long as they adhered to broad operational goals. Indeed, these elements of effective organization were integral to Auftragstaktik, because they were intended to ensure that, while a subordinate commander could be self-sufficient and aggressive in intent, he would not try anything reckless. The third essential characteristic of the army’s doctrine was the stress it placed upon the fighting power and fitness of the individual German soldier. By no means all the army’s soldiers were obliged to achieve the same exacting physical standards, but enough were to enable the army to march further or drive further than its early opponents. Another vital component of fighting power was, of course, morale, and during the war’s early years the army was assured an ample supply of it. Palpable enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology was stronger among younger soldiers than among their older comrades, but the figure of Hitler personally inspired palpable enthusiasm across age groups. So too did the social and economic policies that were the basis of the Volksgemeinschaft, a supposedly nationwide people’s community of which the Wehrmacht as a whole was the self-styled embodiment. [...] Soldiers also felt the German public’s pride in them, pride founded not just on their victories but also on the older, militaristic values that permeated much of German society.«
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| »Yet it was the Germans’ own strengths that enabled them to triumph so spectacularly. Among other things, they profited from an imaginative and daring operational plan. But if one single, overall reason for the German army’s triumph in the west can be pinpointed, it is that its doctrinal approach to tactics and operations far outclassed that of its opponents. At all levels, it possessed qualities of daring and adaptability, and a capacity to react to the rapidly changing battlefield situation – all hallmarks of Auftragstaktik. The army sustained its initial success thanks to high levels of training, cohesion and morale among its troops, and thanks also to excellent coordination with the Luftwaffe.«
~ Ben H. Shepherd, in: Shepherd, Ben H: Hitler’s Soldiers. The German Army in the Third Reich, New Haven, London: Yale University Press 2016, p. 87. |
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| »National Socialist ideology’s own stress on comradeship, which it had sought particularly to instil in the army’s younger soldiers ever since their days in the Hitler Youth, undoubtedly played a significant role in further impressing its importance upon the troops. Indeed, it will be clear from these pages that the the proliferation and potency of Nazi values across the Ostheer should not be downplayed. Their most important impact on the combat performance of the troops on the eastern front in 1944 was less upon their willingness to fight than upon their ability to fight. Yet the level at which they made this effect felt was so basic as to have less to do with Nazi values than with the essential qualities any officer needed in order to lead, and any soldier needed in order to survive, within such a hellish environment as the eastern front. Nazi ideology placed great importance upon qualities such as courage, endurance, resourcefulness and strength of character, as well as upon comradeship. So too did the German military’s long-standing ethos of Auftragstaktik, one to which it had long subscribed not for ideological reasons, but because it got the best performance out of the troops. But most fundamentally, so too did any officer seeking to keep his men alive, and any soldier wishing to return from the eastern front alive.«
~ Ben H. Shepherd, in: Shepherd, Ben H: Hitler’s Soldiers. The German Army in the Third Reich, New Haven, London: Yale University Press 2016, p. 396. |
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| »The qualities of the German soldier, and the ability of commanders at all levels to think and act independently and effectively, were indeed key to German victory. Yet further essential preconditions for the German army’s victories lay in its size, organization and technology.«
~ Ben H. Shepherd, in: Shepherd, Ben H: Hitler’s Soldiers. The German Army in the Third Reich, New Haven, London: Yale University Press 2016, p. xi. |
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| »From 1943 onwards, the German army executed a fighting retreat of unparalleled tenacity, against an increasingly formidable Red Army in the east and a Western Allied coalition powered increasingly by the economic and military might of the United States. It did so to the mounting ruin of itself, its homeland and Nazism’s victims across occupied Europe, long after all plausible hope of victory had evaporated.«
~ Ben H. Shepherd, in: Shepherd, Ben H: Hitler’s Soldiers. The German Army in the Third Reich, New Haven, London: Yale University Press 2016, p. xiii. |
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| »Corti recoiled from the spectacle of Germans massacring Russian prisoners, though he knew that the Red Army often did likewise to its own captives. “It was extremely painful—for we were civilised men—to be caught up in that savage clash between barbarians.” He was torn between disgust at the Germans’ ruthlessness, “which at times disqualified them in my eyes from membership of the human family,” and grudging respect for their strength of will. He deplored their contempt for other races. He heard of their officers shooting men too badly wounded to move, of rapes and murders, of sledges loaded with Italian wounded hijacked by the Wehrmacht. But he was also awed by the manner in which German soldiers instinctively performed their duties, even without an officer or NCO to give orders. “I... asked myself... what would have become of us without the Germans. I was reluctantly forced to admit that alone, we Italians would have ended up in enemy hands...I... thanked heaven that they were with us there in the column... Without a shadow of a doubt, as soldiers they have no equal.”«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Inferno. The World at War 1939-1945, New York: Random House 2011, p. 312. |
Source cited: Eugenio Conti, Few Returned: 28 Days on the Russian Front, Winter 1942-1945 (1997), p. 138. | ||
| »Several times a question I had already asked myself earlier during the days of the march recurred to me: what would have become of us without the Germans? And regrettably I was compelled to admit that had we been alone, we Italians would have ended up in enemy hands. So while on the one hand I abhorred the Germans for their inhumanity (which at times disqualified them, in my eyes, from membership of the human family) and for the really trivial haughtiness with which they showed that they considered every other man an inferior being—born to be exploited and expected to be grateful to his exploiters—I also thanked heaven that they were with us there in the column.
And—much to the chagrin of my soldier’s heart—during the fighting I prayed to heaven that they would bring us victory. Much as I disliked them, I also had to admit that, without a shadow of a doubt, as soldiers they have no equal. Whatever my human aversion to them as a man, it is only right that, as a soldier, I acknowledge this.« ~ Eugenio Corti, Italian soldier, in: Corti, Eugenio: Few Returned. Twenty-eight Days on the Russian Front, Winter 1942-1943, translated by Peter Edward Levy, Columbia / London: University of Missouri Press 1997, pp. 138-139. |
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| »Lt. Tony Moody was one of a host of young Americans who found themselves overwhelmed by the experience of retreat. “I wasn’t scared at the beginning—I got more scared: it was the uncertainty; we had no mission, we didn’t know where the Germans were. We were so tired, out was of low on ammo. There panic, there was chaos. If you feel rations, you get the hell out of it. you’re surrounded by overwhelming forces you get the hell out of it. I was demoralized, sick as a dog. I had frostbite. I felt pretty bad about it. I kept thinking ‘oh my God, what I have got into? How much of this can I take?’ I suddenly found myself quite alone, and wandered off. I stumbled into a battalion aid station and I just collapsed . . . slept twenty four hours. The mind washes out a lot of images, but you remember the feeling of hopelessness, despair. You just want to die. We felt the Germans were much better trained, better equipped, a better fighting machine than us.”«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Inferno. The World at War 1939-1945, New York: Random House 2011, p. 571-572. |
Look at source of this quote by Moody | ||
| »On the fifth, Hitler’s commander in Hungary reported: “Amid all these stresses and strains, no improvement in morale or performance is visible. The numerical superiority of the enemy, combined with knowledge that the battle is now being fought on German soil, has proved very demoralising for the men. Their only nourishment is a slice of bread and some horsemeat. Movement of any kind is hampered by their physical weakness. In spite of all this and six weeks’ unfulfilled promises of relief, they fight tenaciously and obey orders.” The Russians acknowledged this with grudging respect in a 2 March intelligence report: “Most German soldiers realise the hopelessness of their country’s situation after the January advances, though a few still express faith in German victory. Yet there is no sign of a collapse in enemy morale. They are still fighting with dogged persistence and unbroken discipline.”«
~ Max Hastings, in: Hastings, Max: Inferno. The World at War 1939-1945, New York: Random House 2011, p. 594. |
Look at source quoted here | ||
| »The superiority of the Germans in design, management, and energy were plain. They put into ruthless execution a carefully-prepared plan of action. They comprehended perfectly the use of the air arm on a great scale in all its aspects. Moreover, their individual ascendancy was marked, especially in small parties. At Narvik a mixed and improvised German force barely six thousand strong held at bay for six weeks some twenty thousand Allied troops, and, though driven out of the town, lived to see them depart. The Narvik attack, so brilliantly opened by the Navy, was paralysed by the refusal of the military commander to run what was admittedly a desperate risk. The division of our resources between Narvik and Trondheim was injurious to both our plans. The abandonment of the central thrust on Trondheim wears an aspect of vacillation in the British High Command for which not only the experts but the political chiefs who yielded too easily to their advice must bear a burden. At Namsos there was a muddy waddle forward and back. Only in the Andalsnes expedition did we bite. The Germans traversed in seven days the road from Namsos to Mosjoen, which the British and French had declared impassable. At Bodo and Mo during the retreat of Gubbins’ force to the north we were each time just too late, and the enemy, although they had to overcome hundreds of miles of rugged, snow-clogged country, drove us back in spite of gallant episodes. We, who had the command of the sea and could pounce anywhere on an undefended coast, were out-paced by the enemy moving by land across very large distances in the face of every obstacle. In this Norwegian encounter some of our finest troops, the Scots and Irish Guards, were baffled by the vigour, enterprise and training of Hitler’s young men.«
~ Winston Churchill, in: Churchill, Winston: The Second World War. The Gathering Storm, Boston: 1948, pp. 582-583. |
Find out publisher | ||
| »In Montenegro, during its withdrawal at the end of the war, the German Army left a trail of heroism, though the domination by Nazism over that army and over Germany has suppressed in the world’s mind even the thought of such a thing. The German 21st Corps had to withdraw from Greece across Albania and Montenegro; to its aid came the 91st Corps, which had made its way out of Kosovo and into the valley of the Lim. With the 21st Corps there also retreated the Montenegrin Chetniks, desperate men with fighting capacity. On the long and only way from Greece to the Drina River, the Germans were confronted by a devastated land, demolished bridges, enemy units, and the vengeance of those who were deceived, if only for a moment, by their reputed invincibility. Hungry and half-naked, they cleared mountain landslides, stormed the rocky peaks, carved out bypasses. Allied planes spotted them easily and used them for leisurely target practice on bare mountain slopes, at river fords, in deserted towns and villages. Their fuel ran out, their motorized equipment gave out and was destroyed; everywhere along the road there were charred and overturned trucks. We were told that the Germans killed their gravely wounded, whom they couldn’t get out. They seized farm animals—anything they could find to eat. They took worn-out, shabby peasant clothing. No one begrudged them that, because they didn’t molest civilians or burn dwellings. In the end they got through, leaving a memory of their martial manhood—albeit a fleeting and unrecorded memory. Apparently the German Army could wage war—and far more successfully at that—without massacres and gas chambers.«
~ Milovan Djilas, in: Djilas, Milovan: Wartime, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1977, p. 446. |
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| »What surprised me more than anything during all these negotiations was how little of ‘the Nazi ideology and mentality was evident in the German army, which did not seem at all like an unthinking automated machine. Officer-soldier relations seemed less dis ciplined and more cordial than in other armies. The junior officers ate out of the soldiers’ kettle, at least here on the battlefield. Moreover, their army did not appear particularly organized or blindly obedient. Its militancy and homogeneity sprang from vital national sources rather than from Nazi discipline. Like any other men, they were unhappy that events had embroiled them in a war, but once embroiled they were re solved to win, to avoid a new and worse defeat and shame.«
~ Milovan Djilas, in: Djilas, Milovan: Wartime, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1977, p. 234. |
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| »And so it went into the afternoon: the Germans chasing us from one hill to another. I observed them through my binoculars: young men, collars unbuttoned, agile. The German higher ranks may have suffered from conventionality, but the lower ranks had initiative and resourcefulness. No wonder they disregarded our sporadic firing; they would have advanced boldly even if it had been more organized. We had to rally our scattered forces and push ahead, gasping for breath before the pursuing Germans. It seemed to me that every German was chasing me personally, and no doubt the others had the same feeling: the war and the enemy assume their true likeness when they become one’s personal fate.«
~ Milovan Djilas, in: Djilas, Milovan: Wartime, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1977, p. 112. |
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Anderes / Other
| DD.MM.YYYY | German | English | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| »Die Zeitung von heute morgen schreibt:
„Als der Führer rief: ‚Ich kann nur leben, wenn mein gewaltiger Glaube in das deutsche Volk wieder und wieder durch den Glauben und das Vertrauen des Volkes in mich gestärkt wird!‘, antwortete ihm ein einziger Schrei der Massen, die ihre Treue bekannten.“ Ich werde diesen „Schrei“, dieses unmittelbare Gebrüll von 40.000 Menschen, die sich in einer einzigen Bewegung aufrichten, nicht mehr vergessen. „Hier beginnt eine neue Epoche….“ Nein, es handelt sich nicht um Haß, es handelt sich um Liebe.«
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Scheil Ribbentrop | ||
| »Erst wenn alle diese Stufen durchschritten waren und Hitler die durch die "Z=Plan"= Flotte gesicherte "Weltmachtposition" Deutschlands erkämpft hatte, war seine "programmatische" Prognose: "Deutschland wird entweder Weltmacht oder überhaupt nicht sein" verwirklicht und damit sein über den Aufbau des Kontinentalimperiums hinausgehendes gro8es Ziel erfüllt. Diese für den Zeitraum Anfang 1939 nur aus den Grundtendenzen der Politik Hitlers zu erschlie8ende, nicht aber quellenmäßig zu belegende These gewinnt durch die Argumentation Hitlers und der Seekriegsleitung Mitte 19404, als es um die Fortsetzung dieses Flottenbaus nach dem erwarteten "Ausgleich" mit Großbritannien ging, einen hohen Grad von Wahrscheinlichkeit.«
~ Andreas Hillgruber, in: Hillgruber, Andreas: Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegsführung 1940-1941, Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen 1965, S. 37. |